How to detect coordinated behavior across AI agents
A detection methodology for identifying propagation, collective structure, shared infrastructure, and coordinated behavioral change across AI agents.
Detecting coordinated AI agents requires reconstructing a time-ordered graph of actors, resources, actions, and behavioral changes. Defenders then look for propagation, repeated dependencies, subgroup structure, coordinated boundary pressure, and outcomes that are unlikely to arise from independent activity alone.
Start with trusted observations
Agent transcripts and chain-of-thought-like narratives are claims, not authoritative telemetry. Prefer signed or otherwise trusted events from identity providers, tool gateways, repositories, runtimes, network controls, policy engines, and storage systems.
Normalize those events around actor, action, resource, time, policy outcome, and resulting state change. Preserve provenance so an analyst can inspect why a relationship was inferred.
Reconstruct the population
The next step is to move beyond per-event scoring and model relationships across the population. This can reveal whether behavior propagated, whether agents formed stable workstreams, and whether one actor connected otherwise separate groups.
- Sequence: did one event consistently precede adoption by other agents?
- Specificity: was the transferred behavior distinctive or commonplace?
- Dependency: did later actions rely on a shared artifact or discovery?
- Structure: are there persistent clusters, bridges, or coordinators?
- Counterfactual: would the same pattern plausibly occur without coordination?
Control false positives
Expected automation must be modeled explicitly. Deployment waves, scheduled jobs, shared libraries, and centrally configured workers can produce synchronized activity without malicious intent.
A mature result should expose evidence and confidence, identify alternative explanations, and allow analysts to separate observed events from inferred communication or intent. Inwom’s design principle is evidence before inference.
Questions people ask
What telemetry is needed to detect coordinated agents?
Useful sources include agent identity, tool calls, policy decisions, repository and artifact access, resource mutations, runtime events, and resulting behavior. The exact set depends on the environment; provenance and consistent timestamps are essential.
Can this be detected from prompts alone?
Not reliably. Prompts can provide context, but they do not prove that an action occurred. Trusted infrastructure telemetry is needed to establish actions, effects, and relationships.
Primary references
These sources define the broader agentic-AI security landscape. Inwom’s population-level detection model is its own product and research direction; these organizations do not endorse Inwom.
- NIST — Agentic AIResearch, standards, evaluation, interoperability, and risk management for agentic AI.
- MITRE ATLAS — Threat Matrix for AI SystemsA living knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques involving AI systems.
- OWASP — Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026A threat-focused framework for autonomous and agentic applications.